As the British Columbia salmon fishery expanded in the early twentieth century, resource managers struggled to effectively discharge their responsibilities. With limited capability to manage and enforce regulations on the numerous salmon spawning streams spread over a long and sparsely-populated coastline, various exclusive fishing privileges often appeared to be viable solutions. Local managers, particularly, viewed exclusive rights as an expedient way of facilitating regulation. Exclusive area fishing privileges were often granted for drag and purse seines. The number of processing plants in northern areas was limited and each plant given a fixed number of fishing licences. Traps, an efficient means of capturing salmon, were permitted in certain areas. But, despite the potential for efficient harvesting and other benefits, these exclusive rights allocations did not last. Established to meet short-term needs, not longterm benefits, the rights allocations were flawed. With little assurance of continuing exclusivity, no secure long term tenure, and little transferability the rights were incomplete. Those holding them saw little benefit in taking any responsibility for managing and conserving the resource. Each had the potential to generate rents but little attempt was made to collect rent, despite common knowledge of the profits generated in many cases. The rights allocations were opposed by small boat fishers, often viewed as privileges for a favoured and politically connected few, and barriers to many others eager to enter the industry. The successful establishment of exclusive use rights depends on the objectives and structure of the rights system.
INTRODUCTION
While many studies examine the progression of a fishery from open access to access limited by the creation of property rights, this is a report of the opposite move, from various forms of rights based access to open access. The fishery considered is the British Columbia salmon fishery from the late nineteenth century to the 1930s, an era of rapid development of the industry. The industry moved from reliance on one species, sockeye, and one river, the Fraser, to all species and all areas of the coast. Demand developed for other species and production on the Fraser River was severely curtailed by partial blockage of the river during railroad construction. This era also saw the adoption of new fishing techniques, mechanisation of fishing and processing, and similar expansions in neighbouring parts of the United States. Canning remained the dominant processing method. Not only did resource managers have to contend with a growing industry but also with limited knowledge of the resource, minimal budgets for administration and regulation, increasing conflict with the United States over jointly accessible stocks, and uncertainty about jurisdictional responsibility for fishing. All these elements influenced management.
Jurisdictional uncertainty arose from provincial challenges to the federal government's assumption of complete authority over fishing after confederation in 1867. Both governments wanted a major role, not always trusting the other and viewing the industry as a source of revenue, a basis of development, and a way of distributing favours. Court decisions in 1882 and 1898 allowed provinces to allocate proprietary rights in fisheries and gave them limited legislative powers, encouraging many provinces to aspire to a wider role. 3 British Columbia allowed the federal government to take the lead for a time but in 1908 created its own licencing and regulatory system. Both governments then issued cannery and fishing licences, not always agreeing on licencing policy and regulations. 4 The federal government, in particular, was often unsure about its authority and wary of making moves. Finally, in 1913 a court decision limited the provincial role in tidal fisheries and confirmed federal legislative authority over fisheries.
The expansion of the industry to all areas and all species placed considerable pressure on fishery administrators. Initially, in the major sockeye salmon areas, fishing occurred in relatively limited areas and focussed on one species. The expanded fisheries for other species of salmon meant fishing spread to practically all rivers and streams of the remote coast, a much greater regulatory challenge. Management was further complicated by minimal knowledge of the hundreds of individual stocks and lack of research. With limited resources to manage and enforce regulations, various ways of limiting participation by creating exclusive use rights, rather than allowing open access, were often attractive regulatory tools. These rights could restrict effort in a location, define the fishing gear allowed, and clarify access privileges.
The exclusive use rights discussed here all involve some control over the number of participants. With open access, in contrast, the number of participants is not controlled, usually just the total harvest and the rules of participation. Access to the fishery is open resulting in a continuing contest between managers and fishermen and the dissipation of economic rent. With exclusive use rights access may be controlled by giving an individual or individuals the exclusive use of an area or limiting the number of units of fishing gear allowed.
Recently, rights-based management has been advocated for salmon fisheries. Knapp (2001) proposes rights-based management for the survival and future prosperity of the Alaska salmon industry. With rights-based management fishery administrators would decide on escapements and the allocation of the catch to individual rights-holders. Each rights holder would be allowed a given harvest in an area or during a specific time period. The rights holder would choose the harvesting method or methods, including, possibly, fish traps. Each rights holder would have guaranteed landings, not having to compete for the available fish. Schwindt, Vining, and Weimer (2003) , in evaluating policy alternatives to the current salmon fishery in British Columbia, rank river-specific exclusive ownership rights the highest. The right to catch all salmon entering a river system, except for the Fraser River, would be allocated to a rights holder for twenty-five years. Here the rights holder would determine escapement. Because of its size the Fraser River arrangement would be similar to that proposed for Alaska; fishery managers would decide on rights holders and allocate the catch among them. Exclusive use rights could potentially yield benefits from efficiency of harvesting through limitation of effort and a continuing incentive to adopt more efficient harvesting technology, the capture of resource rent with lower harvesting costs, stock management improvements since rights holders have incentives to allow adequate escapement, lower public costs as rights holders assume many management and regulatory functions, improvements in product quality as harvesting and processing are coordinated, ease of allocation of subsets of rights for particular groups such as Aboriginals, and greater flexibility in adapting to changing natural and economic conditions. The rise and fall of several systems of exclusive rights will be reviewed here: granting exclusive area fishing privileges; granting exclusive use of a given type of fishing gear in an area, specifically beach seines and purse seines; the use of fixed fish traps, as opposed to mobile fishing boats; and limiting the number of processors in an area and allowing them to allocate fishing licences. While each had the potential to achieve the benefits of rights-based management all were eventually abandoned due to deficiencies in the rights. The reasons for their demise will be explored.
IMPLEMENTATION OF EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS

Exclusive area fishing privileges
Before 1903 a small number of exclusive area fishing privileges or leases were awarded by the federal government. Generally these were for specific sections of the British Columbia coast with an annual fee and for periods up to nine years. 5 The leases could be quite extensive, one was for sixty miles of coast line on the east shore of Vancouver Island, granted in 1902 for nine years with an annual fee of $50. The holder of this lease then sub-let these privileges. In 1905 the holder received $1000 for the sub-lease, a nice profit on the $50 fee. 6 Smith's Inlet on the central coast provides another example of the rent available from exclusive fishing privileges. In 1902 the "exclusive right of fishing with nets and other legal gear" at the head of the inlet was awarded for an annual fee of $25 to a co-owner of the only cannery in the inlet. This operation was extremely profitable. The cannery and lease sold for $300,000 in 1911, far more than that paid for any other cannery at that time. 7 These profits did not go unnoticed. In 1916, when an additional cannery licence was issued for the inlet, the BC Deputy Commissioner of Fisheries suggested auctioning the additional cannery licence: "…I see no reason the respective governments should not obtain some advantage if a license is to be granted." 8 But this does not seem to have occurred.
The use of exclusive long-term leases floundered on such abuses. The federal department later characterised the leases as "tentative" and described the experience as "…not such as would prompt it to increase their numbers." 9 After 1903 multi-year leases were no longer issued or renewed and some the government wanted to cancel. 10 A 1905-1907 investigatory commission, noting abuses of lease privileges with some not used and held for speculation, some offered for sale, and some sub-let, recommended that no further leases be granted. 11 The jurisdictional uncertainty of the time also made the federal government wary of granting long-term leases. In 1903 the department stated that it would not be issuing multi-year leases as it "might complicate matters" with the provincial government. 12 With misuse by some lease holders, public and provincial government opposition, and a predicted unmanageable demand, all exclusive leases for sections of the coast were allowed to expire. 13 
Beach or drag seines
With the expansion of fishing to the smaller rivers and creeks, new types of fishing gear were needed. Beach or drag seines were more suitable for these smaller rivers and creeks then the gillnets used in the major rivers and inlets. Beach seines had a cork line above and a lead line below the web. One end was fastened on shore and the other set from a boat in a circle around the salmon and brought ashore. The net was then pulled ashore, often manually, with the lower edge dragging on the bottom to trap the fish. Drag seines could be quite effective, sometimes too effective.
Beach seines were always controversial. They were banned in 1890 but, after claims that salmon could not be caught in sufficient quantity in some areas otherwise to support a cannery, some beach seines were allowed in 1894 under special permit. 14 In March 1904 the government announced its intention to more 5 National Archives of Canada (hereafter NAC), RG23, vol. 326, file 2780(1) Amalgamation, c. 1925 , reproduced in Newell (1989a , 222. The cannery was assessed by a government commission at $10,000. Parliament, 14 April 1909) generally issue seine and trap licences. 15 An order-in-council of May 2, 1904 rescinded the prohibition on nets other than gillnets for catching salmon. Licences for beach seines were now more widely available. 16 The department granted one licence per area, not considering it "feasible, nor desirable in the public interest, to grant different drag [beach] seine licences for the same area." A beach seine licence gave exclusive fishing privileges for a stretch of coast with at least one creek or small river. In practice, but not part of the regulations, the licence was usually for about fifteen miles of coastline. Exclusive licences were justified on conservation grounds; the deputy minister wrote: "The run of salmon to these small creeks is … not large and will not admit of a great deal of fishing … if over-fishing is to be prevented, it is essential that the amount of fishing allowed must be carefully restricted." 17 By 1912, 139 beach seine licences were issued.
Again, however, these privileges were abused. A canner complained about speculation in licences arguing that "in a great many instances these licences are sought after and obtained by parties having no intention of utilizing the privilege for legitimate canning purposes, but with the sole object of selling the use of the license to someone else." 18 The inspector for the northern district complained that "There had been too much speculation in seining privileges in my District of late and I am resolved to stop it…." 19 
Purse Seines
Purse seining for salmon was first done in Washington state in the 1880s and was obviously suitable for Canadian waters. Purse seining, where the fish are captured by being encircled, is done from a boat or boats away from shore. In 1903, after a Canadian commission recommended allowing purse seining in BC waters, partly to increase the Canadian share of Fraser River fish, purse seines were permitted. 20 The first purse seine licence was "for fishing in open waters of Barclay Sound, between Cape Beale and Ucluelet, containing conditions protecting approaches to mouths of inlets and rivers and other conditions necessary to such untried fishing engines. Tentative fee fifty dollars." 21 With no experience with this type of licence, the conditions of this initial licence were regarded as temporary, the local inspector was advised to become informed about this fishing gear so that licences could be issued with appropriate conditions. 22 Initially all purse seining operations were done manually but adaptation of the internal combustion engine to marine use increased these vessels' mobility and efficiency.
With purse seining now permitted and feasible, fisheries administrators faced the problem of how to allocate these licences. Initially, purse seine licences were for limited areas, a restriction imposed primarily for conservation purposes. The northern district inspector, in commenting on a particular licence application, noted that a purse seine licence had already been issued for that area but "…this vast area of water I consider is able to support the operation of two purse seines, without endangering the conservation of the fisheries in this vicinity." 23 Licences were issued for areas such as "the vicinity of the mouth of the Skeena River" or "Esperanza and Nuchatlitz Inlets on the west coast of Vancouver Island" with a limit, sometimes of one or two, on the number of licences in an area. An application could be turned down if, in the opinion of the local inspector, there was already the number of licences appropriate for the area.
Purse and drag seine licences were to be renewed annually. Those who held licences and used them or intended to use them were renewed on application but the federal department would not make any commitment for more than one year. 24 holders did take a long run view. The chief inspector, in an overview of fishing conditions in 1919, discussed the situation for the Bella Bella area on the central coast where a canner had the exclusive rights for the area, holding eight drag seine and four purse seine licences. The company, having exclusive use of the area, concentrated on the better streams and rivers, allowing the poorer runs to build up. His report was that good catches were made and the stocks increased. 25 
Traps
Traps were another fishing gear first used in Washington state. For a salmon trap netting is hung on piles set across a migration route to guide the fish to a collection area. Traps have many advantages: well placed traps catch fish at a very low cost, a high quality product can be produced as fish are available fresh and in the needed quantities for processing, and traps are easily regulated. In the 1890s Americans, using fixed traps, increased their harvest of Fraser River sockeye, catching more than Canadians in three of the four years from 1899 to 1902 as the fish migrated through American waters on their return to the river. Canadians felt the American harvest was made unfairly and was a severe threat to the Fraser fishery. 26 The cost advantage was regarded as particularly unjust by canners since both countries sold considerable amounts in the British market. Canadian fishermen, however, strongly opposed traps, arguing, quite correctly, that traps would reduce their landings. 27 Despite the opposition, in 1904 the federal government rescinded the 1894 ban on all but gillnets, thus permitting trap net licences to be issued. 28 There was little attempt to extract any economic rent, a trap net licence was $75. 29 Licences were first issued for sites at the southern end of Vancouver Island, along the route followed by the migrating Fraser River salmon before running the gauntlet of the American traps. Only three or four traps operated in 1904, although twenty-five licences were granted and over 100 had applied, some asking for traps at multiple locations. 30 A trap licence was usually granted on the basis that it not interfere with other trap locations and, after the provincial government became active in licensing, the concurrence of the provincial government. 31 The maximum number of traps operated was never more than twenty. Not all sites were profitable and after 1922 only three to six operated in the area. 32 Traps were never responsible for more than a small proportion of total British Columbia landings. 33 Later, again in response to traps operating in adjacent American waters, traps were licenced and operated in northern border waters. In 1917 four trap licences were awarded for areas adjacent to the border with Alaska. 34 not renewed for 1927 and 1928. 35 A canner pressed for renewal claiming they would not take fish that would otherwise be caught by Canadian fishermen, but fishermen objected. 36 A commissioner, appointed to settle the issue, recommended that traps be permitted in two channels forming part of the border but, due to vigorous opposition to these traps, no further licences were issued for the northern boundary area. 37 The traps allowed at the northern and southern borders were allowed principally in retaliation for nearby American traps. Initially, trap net applications were refused for other areas. 38 In January 1917, however, with an increased demand for pink and chum salmon, the Minister approved traps for these species. 39 Only six licences were granted, all in waters between northern Vancouver Island and the mainland. 40 These traps were allowed to operate until the end of the 1920 season. In 1918 a trap was reported to have been built on the river at the head of Nitinat Lake which drains on the south-west coast of Vancouver Island. 41 Limiting the number of fishermen Initially, most fishing was done with one or two person gillnet boats. As the industry expanded outside the Fraser River canners in the various areas often colluded to limit the total number of gillnet boats in an area and assign a number to each cannery, with the knowledge, acquiescence, and even encouragement of fishery managers. This type of scheme for an area was referred to as a "boat rating." Conservation was often given as the reason for the limitation and, with a limited fishing time per week, there were conservation benefits but, of course, there were economic benefits to canners. Fewer fishermen would have to be transported north, fewer boats outfitted and serviced, and, with fishermen tied to canneries, the pressure to increase the prices paid to fishermen would be restrained.
The earliest instance of "boat rating" was in 1899 when Rivers Inlet canners agreed on a total of 530 boats and their allocation. This agreement held until 1905 when three more canneries were built and a further agreement could not be negotiated. 42 A similar agreement was made in 1903 by Skeena River canners and renewed from 1904 to 1907. 43 The 1905-07 commission encouraged these arrangements, recommending limits on the number of fishing boats in each major northern area for five years starting in 1906, and having the canners allocate these boats among themselves. 44 In 1908, failing to come to an agreement, the 37 Ibid., vol. 765, (3) canners appointed a committee to set a rating for 1908. 45 The ratings held for 1908 but in 1909 several canners increased their numbers of boats and in 1910 almost every canner threatened to increase their numbers. For the 1910 season the provincial government simply informed all canners of the number of licences that would be issued for each northern cannery. 46 To provide a more permanent solution the federal and provincial governments appointed a joint commission, based on the reasoning that the impact of limiting canneries was curbed if the number of fishing boats was not also limited. The report in July 1910 recommended the total number of fishing licences for all areas of the north and how these licences were to be divided between canneries, the recommendations to be for five years. The recommendations were based on the capacities of spawning grounds and cannery outputs. In most areas fishing was to be done by gillnets; but some areas had drag seines or purse seines allocated. 47 The recommended boat rating was made effective by federal order-in-council in December 1910. 48 The boat ratings, previously only agreements between canners, now had formal government approval and, by dividing the available fishing licences among the established canneries, effectively limited the number of canneries.
The provincial government defended the boat rating, arguing that "the rating was designed, first to insure permanence to fishing in waters that had already been exploited to their limit, and by only such a limitation could the Government secure conditions whereby a sufficient number of seed fish would reach the spawning bed." 49 The federal view of the 1910 boat rating was more perceptive, recognising that, although the boat rating made controlling fishing easier, the northern boat rating was certainly favourable to the established canners. With all fishing licences attached to the current canneries, entry of new canners was blocked and canners could set prices as fishermen had little choice about where to sell their fish. 50 The federal Superintendent of Fisheries later commented that "…unless the canners were required to pay into the treasury a large enough amount in the way of licence fees to justify the special privileges thus given them, the limitation of canneries was not desirable and this Department should confine its efforts to prevent over-fishing." 51 The federal department wished to end the boat rating but believed that this would place "the fishery almost entirely in the hands of naturalised Japanese fishermen, and this was not regarded as desirable." 52 Thus, starting in 1913, the boat rating for canneries was eased out by taking increasing numbers of licences from canneries and making them available to "white fishermen" who applied independent of a cannery. The remainder of the licences were granted to "Indian and other applicants" as licences attached to canneries. The "other applicants" would be those of Japanese ethnic origin. 53 McIntyre appears to be responding to the comments of some BC MPs who had commented that, while it was fair to limit the number of canneries, they did not agree with limiting the number of fishermen. 50 Francis Millerd papers. Statement Submitted by Mr. W.A. Found, Superintendent of Fisheries to the Fisheries Commission, 10 July 1917. In commenting on the impact of the boat rating, Found noted that "The provincial government had always been strongly in favour of allowing no additional canneries". The advantage to canners of the boat rating is indicated by "the most strenuous protests … by the Canners' Association" when the Department later announced that the boat rating was to end. (NAC, RG23, vol. 930 policy is obviously unsatisfactory to the Indian and naturalised Japanese fishermen…Indeed it seems impossible in the light of the experiences growing out of the War to much longer refuse Japanese naturalized fishermen the same privileges as others." Found reported that by 1917 the number of attached licences was reduced by half in some areas. In any given year and area there was a maximum number of "independent white" licences available. (Report of the B.C. Commissioner of Fisheries for the year ending December 31, 1912) number of canneries was practically impossible, thus the total number of boats allowed in some areas increased to accommodate the new canneries. 54 
Limiting the number of canneries
Although the allocations of the limited number of fishing licences in various areas also limited the number of canneries the number of processors was for a time more directly limited. The first interim report of the 1905-1907 commission recommended "that immediate measures are necessary to limit the number of canneries in …[northern areas] or the fisheries there will be in danger of depletion". 55 Limiting the number of canneries in an area would be an indirect resource management tool as fewer processors in an area would at least partially check the pressure to increase the number of fishermen. Of course a limit on the number of canneries in an area would be of benefit to those fortunate to have the privilege to operate there.
Before 1908 neither the federal nor provincial government required a licence to operate a salmon cannery but in 1908 the provincial government passed legislation requiring licences for canneries. 56 The provincial policy was to "limit the number of canneries in an area to make sure that those operating can make a profit and to protect fish. … [I]f the canneries are operating at a loss they will evade your regulations and they will make inroads upon your capital stock of fish." 57 Justifying their action by conservation, the provincial government was clearly protecting operating canners. The provincial government claimed that they waited for the federal government to act on the recommendation of the 1905-07 commission to limit canneries in the north before they acted. 58 A federal order-in-council requiring canneries to be licenced and pay a fee was passed in 1908, an action doubtless stimulated by provincial action. These same regulations stated that no additional canneries would be licenced in the north. 59 The two governments coordinated the issuing of cannery licences in the north between 1908 and 1913, although the federal government contended they wanted to licence additional canneries while the province did not. 60 The dual jurisdiction continued until the 1913 Privy Council decision established exclusive federal authority over fishing in tidal waters. The federal department believed, in licencing new canneries, that it should not limit the number of canneries in an area but should concentrate on preventing over-fishing. 61 The federal government realized there were benefits to the limited number of canners, one reason for increasing the number of canneries. The minister later stated that "In earlier years it did not seem feasible to attach fees to the salmon canning and fishing privileges, which this department felt were commensurate with the value of these privileges. Hence, in 1913 the Department embarked on the policy of gradually increasing the number of canneries…. A later history of the province's involvement in fisheries stated that "provincial policy reflected far more concern with the economic performance of the industry than federal policy. Early provincial policy was concerned with limiting the number of vessels engaged in fishing in order to conserve the stock, and also with limiting the number of cannery licences to areas where good fishing runs were available to make the cannery industry strong and healthy." (B.C. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food (1996) the local newspaper asserted in 1916 that "the breaking of the salmon fishing and canning monopoly is the most important question in British Columbia. … [T]he business of canning is in the hands of a few, who control the salmon fisheries of the northern waters in such a way that the white fisherman has no chance to make a living by fishing for salmon…." 64 A delegation from the city went to Ottawa to protest against the "cannery monopoly" and ask that the exclusive rights of canneries at the mouths of streams, the beach seine licences, be abolished and purse seines be allowed to fish in these areas. 65 In 1917 the federal government moved to deal with some of the festering issues. Beginning in 1918, the practice of attaching fishing licences to canneries was to end and all fishing licences issued independent of a cannery. 66 The number of licences issued for each area would still be limited. Removal of restrictions on the number of cannery licences was also announced. 67 Canners, as expected, objected arguing that limiting the number of boats and not the number of canneries discriminated against canners and that there were few true independent fishermen in the north, as most fishermen were supported by canners. 68 Canners successfully advocated for the appointment of a commission to investigate the industry, even agreeing, after departmental pressure, to an investigation of their profits. 69 
The 1917 Commission
The Special Fishery Commission 1917 was appointed by federal order-in-council on July 2, 1917. The commissioners were neither public servants nor politicians; an economist was chairman, the other two members were businessmen. On the question of whether the number of salmon canneries now operating in the northern district be limited, the commission recommended that the number of cannery licences not be increased for five years. The commission regarded the existing plants as more than adequate for the current supply of salmon but also recommended that licence duties on canneries be increased on the basis of the number of fish canned and profits made "so that while enjoying an adequate return the canneries may contribute to the public treasury, for the propagation and conservation of the salmon or for other proper public purposes, due compensation for the privileges conferred." 70 The Commission also recommended that there be no increase in the number of boats in the northern district, as there were adequate for the available fish, and only licences with no connection to a cannery should be issued, The Commission claimed this would provide fishermen with a more competitive market for their fish. Although not using the term "common property", the consequences of the common property nature of the salmon fishery were clearly recognized and dealt with. The commission realized that the use of more capital and labour than necessary in either fishing or processing cannot increase output but dissipates profits or the rent available from the fishery. With limitations on inputs, any excess profits should go to the government to pay for management of the resource and for the privilege of fishing. 71 This was a very perceptive analysis and one on which the Commission's recommendations were built.
After the 1917 Commission
For 1919 the department proposed that the recommendations of the 1917 commission be put into effect. Fishing licences would be limited, but none attached to canneries. The number of canneries would also be limited and fishing and cannery licence fees raised to be "commensurate with the value of the privilege" so that "the revenue should be sufficient to at least cover the cost of administration, protection, and development of the industry by this Department." The fee increases recommended were considerable, trap net licences were to go from $75 to $500 plus a half cent per fish taken, purse seine licences from $50 to $300 plus a half cent per fish, drag seine licences from $25 to $150 plus a half cent per fish, gill net licences from $5 to $10, trolling licences from $1 to $5, and cannery licences from $50 to $500 plus four cents per case of sockeye and three cents per case of other species. Although the 1917 Commission only considered the northern district, the licence limitations and increases in fees were to apply to the whole province. The basic principles of the 1917 Commission were applied throughout the fishery. 72 The Minister announced changes in policy for 1919: no further canneries would be licenced for five years, except in areas with an over-supply of fish, and all licence fees were to be raised as proposed. 73 Just as the policy changes were proposed, however, World War I finally ended and the Department now faced demands to provide fishing licences for veterans. 74 Employment opportunities in other industries were limited. With the end of the war the economy staggered; manufacturing employment fell, agricultural prices were down, and real GNP declined. The dilemma for the department was how to provide for the veterans while restricting licences and raising cannery licence fees. A department official wrote that "While it is the earnest desire and endeavour of this Department to do everything it feasibly can … to facilitate procuring employment for returned soldiers it must not be forgotten that the existing policy specifically states that one of its objects is to enable those engaging in the canning industry to operate as economically as possible and in return for giving them large and comparatively exclusive fishing privileges, they are required to compensate the public by adequately paying into the public treasury for the privileges they receive." 75 Despite the announced policy that those benefiting from restricted licences should pay for the privilege, public and political pressure was building to end restrictions. Members of Parliament favoured removal of restrictions on the number of cannery and fishing licences and using other ways to protect the runs, with first consideration for licences given to "returned soldiers", a phrase used to describe all veterans. 76 For 1919 the department attempted to accommodate this wish. All applications from veterans for gillnet licences would be granted. Where the number of licences was limited, a proportion of licences would be reserved for veterans until a month before the season started. Additional seine licences would only be issued to "bona fide" veterans. 77 While restrictions were loosened for 1919, many, including the British Columbia members of Parliament, however, wanted complete abolition of all restrictions on fishing and cannery licences. One issue, however, on which the members had difficulty was the effect of removing limitations on the number of fishermen of Japanese ethnic origin in the industry. 78 Some members and some groups of "white fishermen" advocated limiting and gradually eliminating fishermen of Japanese ethnic origin. 79 In the Department' view, many of the licences allocated to veterans were not properly used. Some veterans given licences were reported to have sold or leased them to others; others were reported to have asked canners for payments over and above the price of fish. The department predicted this problem would become worse in the future leading to an investigation such that "those in charge of the administration of the fisheries will be condemned on practically all hands." 80 72 NAC, RG 23, vol. 930, file 721-4-6(16) Memorandum for the Minister Re Policy and Regulations to Govern the Salmon Fishery of British Columbia, November 13, 1918. The increased fees were projected to raise $320,500, more than enough to cover the coming year's operating expenditures for the department. 73 Ibid., vol. 931, file 721-4-6(17) Note for Press, 6 December 1918. 74 During the war 45,314 British Columbia resident males voluntarily enlisted in the army's Canadian Expeditionary Force; the province had the highest per capita volunteer rate in Canada. Another 7,786 were conscripted. (Barman 1996 , Sharpe 1983 79 Conley (1988) 80 NAC, RG23, vol. 931, , Memorandum Re Policy for British Columbia Fishery, 11 November 1919. The memo does state that no formal investigation which would give the true situation was carried out.
Given the political wish to end restrictions and the unsatisfactory experience with partial restrictions, the Superintendent of Fisheries now proposed returning to pre-1917 recommendations, an "open door" policy with no limitations on the numbers of fishing and cannery licences. Runs would be protected by restricting fishing time and hiring more fishery officers. 81 The northern area, with its limits on fishing and canning licences, would be the most affected. While unlimited gillnet licences were not expected to cause management difficulties, the district inspector predicted that the "purse and drag-seine question has practically insurmountable difficulties." With no limit on the number of seiners "depletion of these fisheries will inevitably follow, all licensees would flock to the good sockeye creeks," areas would have to be closed and a "regiment of officers" needed to enforce the closures. 82 In January 1920 the "open door" policy was announced. There would be no limit on the number of gillnet, purse seine, trolling, and cannery licences, but only for "white British subjects." Bowing to public pressure, there were racial restrictions on licences. The number of gillnet, purse seine and troll licences issued to "other than white men or native Indians" was not to exceed the number issued in 1919. Those of Japanese ethnic origin were not to have more licences than they had in the previous year. The total number of licenses in an area would be limited. Beach seines were to be replaced with purse seines where possible but if no other fishing method was feasible in a location the beach seine licence could continue to be issued. Only existing trap licences were to continue. 83 Other forms of regulation were now needed: fishing boundaries were placed at the mouths of rivers, weekly closed times extended, and the fishing season curtailed in some areas. 84 In justifying the "open door" policy the Minister stated that the industry was "almost a monopoly and the fisheries belong to all the people." 85 The department wrote that it had felt for years that the "open door" policy was the appropriate one but held off implementing the policy because of the difficulties in properly protecting all areas, difficulties which are certainly less if "undue competition is prevented." Now the department feels it has greater ability to protect the salmon runs and can allow increased numbers of fishermen. 86 The previous limitation of fishing and canning licences in the north no doubt made regulation of fishing easier but now the department felt it had the capacity to protect stocks even with more fishermen.
Canners were unhappy with the results of the significant increase in fishing and canning fees in 1919 and then the lifting of restrictions on the numbers of licences in 1920. In 1920 canned salmon prices were high and fish plentiful, canners could absorb the higher fees. In 1921, however, prices fell and the increased fees were now having an impact. As well, according to the department, other issues needed to be addressed, including protecting and enhancing stocks and the whether or not fresh pink and chum salmon could be exported. 87 A major fishermen's organisation was advocating the elimination of beach seines and traps and 81 Ibid., Memorandum Re Policy for British Columbia Fishery, 11 November 1919. The memo stated that, with no limitations, "naturalized Japanese" would become more significant in the fishery. But "It seems impracticable to exclude them-many of them being returned soldiers-in the absence of any general Governmental policy dealing with the Japanese situation. This difficulty is recognized by the Prince Rupert agitators for an open door policy, but they…say that the proper thing to do in the circumstances is to give such Japanese licences." Although it does not appear to have been announced the departmental memo stated "That from the nature of the industry, it is undesirable that Asiatics should engage therein, whether they are naturalized British subjects or not. Therefore there should be no increase in the fishing privileges available to such naturalized subjects, and a process for their gradual elimination from the industry should be started, by annually decreasing the number of gill-net licences that may be available to them." that licences be valid for the whole coast, not just district they were issued for. 88 A number of issues were simmering, ripe conditions for the appointment of another commission.
The 1922 Commission
This time the commission, appointed in 1922, consisted of members of Parliament. The Commission had its own priorities, recommending that motor boats be permitted in the north for gillnetting, that a joint commission with the state of Washington be established for the restoration of Fraser River sockeye and that various measures be undertaken for the protection of runs. The commission also recommended a substantial reduction in fishing, trap, and cannery fees, to levels considerably below those in 1918 before the last increase. The recommendations of the Commission were put into force by the department.
Perhaps the most significant recommendations of the Commission dealt with restricting JapaneseCanadian access to licences. After 1919 no increase had been allowed in the number of fishing licences awarded to citizens of Japanese ethnic origin. Starting in 1922, following the recommendation of the commission, the number of licences to those of Japanese ethnic origin was to be gradually reduced and their licences to remain attached to the northern canneries. 89 For others access was open and licences unattached with the payment of nominal fees. In 1932 the department finally completely did away with the system of attached licences. 90 Practically all early efforts to allocate property rights had now ended; the only remaining were the few traps allowed near the southern border.
WHY RIGHTS WERE USED
The exclusive use rights considered here were established for a variety of reasons: limited resource management capacity and experience, lack of knowledge of the resource, the primitive technology then used in fishing and processing, competition from the United States, and political and stakeholder pressure. Although there was wide knowledge of the profits that many rights holders enjoyed there was little attempt to generate the benefits of exclusive use rights that are now proposed.
Convenience and expediency were primary reasons for the exclusive use rights discussed here. With local fishery managers having limited resources to manage and enforce regulations, various ways of limiting participation through creation of exclusive use rights, rather than allowing open access, were attractive regulatory tools. As the industry expanded and beach and purse seines were introduced managers faced new and difficult challenges in conserving stocks. Managers had little experience with the new fishing techniques operating in remote areas and little knowledge of the stocks being exploited. Exclusive use rights simplified management by restricting effort in a particular location, defining the fishing gear allowed, and clarifying access privileges.
The inspector for the northern district put a high priority on assigning licence holders to an area and knowing their whereabouts, commenting that "if I lose touch with them [purse seiners], they immediately proceed with their illegal work, fishing during close seasons, barricading, etc." He was also concerned about his ability to enforce regulations warning that if licences are not restricted to an area additional patrol boats will be required. 91 When beach and purse seines were first permitted each licence was for a particular area and the number of licences in each area limited to that estimated to be appropriate for the size of the run. Especially for beach seines often only one licence was allowed in a given location. The primitive and relatively immobile fishing techniques then in use facilitated limiting each licence to a specific location.
While local federal department officials favoured restricting the area in which a beach or purse seine operated and limiting the number in a location, department headquarters officials, were more concerned about the legal implications of allowing exclusivity. They informed local officials in 1906 that purse seine licences were "to convey no privileges of an essentially exclusive character such as would prevent the issue of licences for any reasonable number of similar or other fishing engines in the same vicinity. … the Department reserves to itself the right to limit or extend the number of such licences in any given locality." A licence should have a vague description of the area to which it applies, reducing the implication that the licence gives exclusive privileges. 92 But local officials tended to limit licences for particular areas. In 1908 the officer in charge of the northern coast commented that usually only one purse seine licence was issued for each 20 miles of coast and one drag seine licence for each 15 miles of coast. 93 Since at that time all seine licences had to be approved in Ottawa, it appears that Ottawa at least concurred with this policy.
When canners devised the "boat rating" scheme for limiting and assigning fishing boats in each area, they were no doubt doing this primarily for their own benefit. For them costs were reduced and entrants discouraged. But the scheme also eased regulatory responsibilities for fishery managers as effort in each area would be limited. Thus government managers not only acquiesced to the scheme but encouraged it. Eventually the scheme was formally approved by the government. These exclusive use rights were certainly a convenient management tool.
The primitive fishing technology of the time limited the fishing techniques available for harvesting certain stocks and forced situations where gear numbers had to be limited. Gillnets had limited mobility and were best used in rivers and inlets. Thus beach and purse seines were the only gear types for the smaller streams and rivers and, without close supervision, their numbers had to be strictly controlled.
Not only was the fishing industry expanding at this time but agriculture and other natural resource industries were growing through the allocation of access rights. Exclusive use rights for a fishery may not have appeared much different than homesteading, the allotment of land free to those who clear and farm it, a policy widely used to settle western Canada. The provincial government regarded a limit on the number of canneries in an area as "no more a monopoly that occurs when all the land in a district is allocated." 94 One objective of the time was to offset American catches of Canada-bound fish. For this purpose traps, which implied exclusive rights, were used. Traps were then only feasible for the northern and southern border areas. The major motivation for permitting traps was retaliation for American harvesting of joint stocks, although many canners pressed for the use of traps because of their low costs of harvesting. Traps were first permitted near the southern border to try and land a bigger proportion of the Fraser River fish then heavily harvested by American traps. Later a similar situation developed along the northern boundary and traps were permitted for a time there. The traps in the Johnstone Strait area were only used for a short period of time to assist with the harvesting of pink and chum salmon. No attempt was made to capture any economic rent from traps. Auctioning trap sites was suggested but not carried out. In any case when traps were first introduced into British Columbia it was not clear which sites, if any, would be profitable; some trial and error was necessary.
As was no doubt true with other privileges granted by governments of that time, the awarding of trap, purse seine, and drag seine licences was subject to political influence. Licences in good locations were valuable, particularly when the licences in an area were limited. Politicians were likely not averse to having the power to influence the awarding of these rights. A 1904 internal department memo reminded the Minister that "nothing in connection with Fisheries matters in British Columbia was to be decided without first consulting the Honourable Mr. Templeman." 95 Templeman was a Liberal Senator from Victoria who had earlier informed the Minister that he would advise with reference to the granting of trap-net licences. In 1906 a note appears in the department's file on licences for district 3 (Vancouver Island) that "Mr. Sloan [Liberal Member of Parliament for Comox-Atlin] is to be consulted as to applications for new 92 Ibid., vol. 345, file 3005, part 2, Venning to E. Taylor, Inspector for district 3, 6 February 1906. As an example of keeping the licence area vague, the purse seine licence for Esperanza and Nuchatlitz Inlets was not to specify the various tributaries to these inlets, as had originally been suggested by the local inspector. 93 Ibid., vol. 348, file 3023, part 1, Williams to Venning, 19 May 1908 . 94 PABC, GR435, box 65, file 608, Memo Re Boat Rating, 12 February 1912 , Memorandum Re Application of B.C. Packers Association for Trap-Net Licences, 23 December 1904. licences." 96 Canners, who benefited from many of these rights, no doubt exploited their political connections to encourage continuance of many of these rights.
REASONS FOR THE DEMISE OF EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS
The question is why these early attempts to use of exclusive harvesting rights, now regarded as potentially having useful properties, had such a short life time. Why did policy for the fishery evolve towards open access, rather than towards greater use of various forms of use rights? Although the rights as then devised were flawed and needed improvement they had potential benefits, but still gave way to a policy of open fishing.
Three categories of reasons may be suggested for the discontinuance of these early use rights. The first is that the specific reasons for establishing the rights decreased in importance and new objectives for management of the fishery evolved. The early rights were not established to capture the benefits now proposed for exclusive use rights but were a response to the conditions of the day. Secondly, the rights as then structured were flawed, lacking the characteristics of exclusivity, continuance, and transferability, which provide rights holders with incentives to operate efficiently and responsibly. The flaws in the rights were compounded by uncertainty about the relative jurisdictional responsibilities of the federal and provincial governments. Lastly, the various forms of exclusive access were opposed by other fishermen, elected representatives, members of the public, and many government managers. The benefits of the rights mostly went to the holders, others were excluded. Practically no attempt was made by either the provincial or federal government to capture any economic rent generated as a result of issuing these exclusive use rights.
Change in reasons for the rights
Over time the reasons for establishing these rights were no longer applicable. Developed and used to deal with that era's problems, the rights were not structured to capture the benefits, such as efficiency, rent capture, improved management, lower public costs, quality improvements, and equity that would encourage their continuance. The exclusive use rights established in the era considered here were established because of the issues and circumstances of the time: competition from the United States, limited resource management capacity and experience, lack of knowledge of the resource, the primitive technology then used in fishing and processing, and political and stakeholder pressure. When these reasons were less urgent or no longer valid then the perceived need for the use of these exclusive rights diminished. Changing management goals and capability meant changes in management methods. Initially the primary focus was conservation and, with limited management capability and experience, the exclusive use rights were attractive management tools. The opening of new fishing areas, the primitive and immobile harvesting technology, and the siting of processing plants near the fishing grounds facilitated the use of exclusive use rights. Later, when more focus was placed on providing employment and with greater competition for access to the resource, improved and strengthened management capability allowed open access with stricter regulation of effort.
Assigning exclusive or near-exclusive use rights appeared to be a viable management tool as the fishery expanded away from the Fraser River area and new stocks and species were exploited. With this expansion managers, particularly those in the field, struggled to effectively discharge their responsibilities. The resources to manage fishing effort and enforce regulations for numerous salmon spawning streams and rivers spread over a long and sparsely-populated coastline were limited. Outside the Fraser River, any form of real time management where fishing time would be adjusted according to landings was impossible. Open times and the permitted maximum amount of fishing gear had to be set at the beginning of the season, with the hope that the size of the run was adequate to support the permitted effort and allow an adequate escapement. Resource managers searched for techniques which would fulfil these objectives and could be enforced with the available staff. Local managers were particularly in favour of granting exclusive or semi-exclusive rights for an area. They viewed exclusive rights as an expedient way of facilitating regulation and limiting effort.
Traps were only licenced for specific and limited locations, thus easy to supervise. Various other exclusive fishing rights, where one or a few were allowed to use a particular type of gear in an area, were workable 96 Ibid., vol. 354, file 3081(1) solutions. Purse seines and drag seines were licensed for specific locations, easing the monitoring of their activities. Fishery managers were wary of the use of seines but, given the fishing technology of the era, drag or purse seines were often the only method possible in certain areas or for certain species.
Limiting the number of canneries and the number of gillnet licences for each cannery in an area also appeared to be a practicable and cost-effective way of regulating fishing in an area. These limits on numbers would be easy to monitor. In the northern area and on Vancouver Island canners developed cannery sites and transported fishermen and supplies to and from the sites. Fishermen had to rely on canners for transportation, boats, and nets. This infrastructure provided by the canners was used by fishery managers in regulating effort by limiting the number of canneries and assigning a fixed number of fishermen to each.
Effective rights need property characteristics
Capturing the benefits now seen for exclusive use rights in the salmon fishery requires that the rights be properly structured. The rights should have the characteristics of property; holders of the rights must view the rights as secure. This requires that the rights possess exclusivity, a lack of interference from others and protection from interference; continuance, validity for a time period in which investments in the resource would provide a return; and transferability, the ability to sell or lease the right. Use rights with these characteristics will encourage the holders to act responsibly as if they are owners of the resource; efficiency and conservation are promoted. Lack of these property characteristics or uncertainty about them mean that the rights are defective without full incentives for efficiency and conservation. At the extreme, holders of defective rights will act no differently than those exploiting an open access resource. Any system of exclusive use rights instituted today should be established to capture as many of the currently appreciated benefits as possible. These potential benefits justify the use of exclusive use rights and offset opposition to them.
Unfortunately the use rights awarded in the earlier era did not have the characteristics of exclusivity, continuance, and transferability. The rights were incomplete; they were use or access rights, not ownership rights. Exclusivity was lacking as there was always a threat that others would be allowed to operate in an area. Drag seine licence holders were threatened with the emergence of purse seines and the federal department's wish to do away with drag seines. For purse seines there was no exclusive granting of rights, particularly from Ottawa's point of view. Even though a purse seine may have been the only one allowed in an area, this exclusivity was not guaranteed.
Few had any form of secure long term tenure, and there was little assurance of continuing exclusivity. Licences were granted only on an annual basis, although usually renewed. With the lack of any long-term tenure and the issuing of most licences to individuals or companies there was practically no opportunity to transfer the licences. Thus, although the licences often gave exclusive or limited access to a fishing area or ground they were deficient in the other characteristics, continuance and transferability, which would make them true property rights. One result was that neither the holders of the rights nor the issuing authorities acted as if they were property rights.
The rights were also flawed by jurisdictional uncertainty between the federal and provincial governments. The security of an award of harvesting rights depends on the legitimacy of the institution awarding the rights. If the institution awarding the rights does not legitimately hold the rights to start with then those receiving the rights will not have security of tenure. If there is uncertainty about an institution's jurisdictional powers then its actions will be subject to question. Throughout most of the period jurisdictional issues were unsettled, diminishing the security and value of any rights allocations made by these governments.
The consequence of the flaws and uncertainties about the rights was that the rights holders did not act as if they had secure long-term tenure. Northern canners, in particular, did not act as if they had exclusive use rights. In the earliest days of fishing in the north canners colluded to limit the number of gillnet fishermen allocated to each, with the acquiescence of authorities. This was followed by the federal and provincial governments limiting the number of canneries in each of the northern areas. Canners could have taken advantage of these privileges and seized many of the benefits of exclusivity, particularly efficiency of harvesting and, possibly, conservation through limitation of effort. Canners' opportunities could have been further exploited by continuing to limit the number of fishermen or perhaps even shrinking the number allocated to each, thus reducing their costs.
But the opposite occurred, some canners broke the agreement by increasing their numbers of fishermen, others threatened to increase their numbers. The government then had to set the allocation of fishermen among the canners. As a group canners failed to continue to take advantage of the use rights awarded to them; rights holders did not act as if they had exclusive continuing ownership rights. Those who had joint access to the resource competed instead of cooperating. Even though the potential and actual profits were known, only late in the era did the federal government make an effort to capture the rent generated. Similarly those who were individually given exclusive rights for an area appeared to regard this primarily as a potential profit making or speculative opportunity. Those with privileges did not act responsibly.
A voluntary agreement among canners may be expecting too much. Scott (1993) , in his review of fisheries self-government, states that self-governing groups can regulate how fishing is done but have not been successful in regulating the size of the total catch. Regulating the size of the total catch requires information on individual catches and an agreement on distribution, both of which are difficult to attain. Ostrom (1992) lists the beliefs that each member of a group must have in order to develop a common and jointly beneficial plan to use a common property resource: a belief that cooperation is better than individual action, a belief that there are known alternatives to individual action, a belief that other members of the group can be trusted to do what they say they will do, and a belief that the cost of joint decision making does not exceed the benefits. Canners, each voluntarily limiting the number of boats for a period of time, appear to have held these beliefs but not firmly enough for joint action to continue. Probably some did not believe that all would continue to do as they said. Leal (1996) has enumerated the characteristics of long-enduring community management systems: clearly defined boundaries for the resource and participants, established and binding rules, rules based on local conditions, resources for monitoring and enforcing the rules, mechanisms to resolve conflicts available, and rules not subject to change by government. For the northern canners in each district boundaries and rules were known and fit local conditions but within the group the resources for monitoring and enforcing the rules were inadequate and no mechanisms for resolving conflicts were available. There was also the threat that government would change the overall environment.
The lack of secure continuing property rights could be offset by providing fishermen and canners with alternative sources of supply. Having to rely on a single stream without security could tempt a rights holder to heavily discount future returns and increase current harvests to provide an adequate income or supply of fish. Providing several possible sources of supply would allow a fisherman or canner to provide for conservation while still acquiring an adequate supply of fish. The canner in the Bella Bella area, holding drag seine rights to a number of streams, fishing the stronger runs, allowing the weaker to increase, provides an example of the benefits of providing rights holders with alternatives.
Opposition to the rights
A third reason for the demise of the exclusive use privileges was the strong opposition of many to the rights. Gillnet fishermen were opposed to traps, arguing that the traps meant fewer fish for them. This argument had validity since, although the traps were established to compete with Americans for fish, the traps were no doubt taking some fish that would have been otherwise caught by Canadian fishermen. Gillnetters were successful in having traps on the northern boundary banned. Many of these rights were viewed as privileges for a favoured and politically connected few, a valid observation. Department officials were often asked to seek the approval of politicians before awarding trap and seine licences. In many cases these rights were valuable and the profits they generated were well-known and often viewed as unjustifiable, but little attempt was made to capture this resource rent. In some cases the rights were obtained for speculative purposes or to sub-let, with the possibility of profit for the holder of the rights.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
As the salmon fishery expanded on the west coast of Canada fishery administrators searched for ways to effectively manage the fishery. Limited by the resources available to them, a lack of experience with new fishing methods and fishing dispersed over a remote coastline, little knowledge of the hundreds of stocks in their area, relatively primitive fishing techniques, and pressure from many in the industry, various forms of exclusive use rights were sometimes the only management instruments available. Exclusive area privileges, limiting fishing licences in an area, and limiting the number of processing plants were among the types of exclusive use rights tried.
But the rights only lasted for a short time. The specific reasons for establishing the rights decreased in importance and new objectives for management of the fishery emerged. The early rights were not established to capture the benefits now suggested for exclusive use rights but were a response to the conditions of the day. Managers saw the allocation of certain exclusive use rights as a convenient and expedient way of discharging their responsibilities. Unfortunately, although the benefits to rights holders were known, little attempt was made to capture these benefits. Later, conservation goals were joined by the objective of providing employment, with the result that access to the fishery could not continue to be limited. Also, the rights as then structured were flawed, lacking the characteristics of exclusivity, continuance, and transferability, which provide rights holders with incentives to operate efficiently and responsibly. Rights holders had little inducement to conserve the resource. The flaws in the rights were compounded by uncertainty about the relative jurisdictional responsibilities of the federal and provincial governments. Furthermore, the various forms of exclusive access were opposed by other fishermen, elected representatives, members of the public, and many government managers. The benefits mostly went to the rights holders, others were excluded. Practically no attempt was made by either the provincial or federal government to capture any economic rent generated as a result of issuing these exclusive use rights.
The continuance of any system of exclusive use rights is facilitated by the objectives and structure of the rights. Use rights structured with the principles of efficiency and equity will be more likely to continue than those not so structured.
